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ESSAY
COME THE REVOLUTION: ARE WE FINALLY READY FOR
UNIVERSAL HEALTH INSURANCE?
SUSAN ADLER CHANNICK*
I. THE STATUS QUO
The front page story of the November 25, 2002 New York Times high-
lighted, yet again, the ongoing saga of the growing number of Americans
who are without health insurance.' While this topic has been written about
many times, the New York Times article had a slightly different take on the
problem: no longer is this a problem exclusive to the poor and unemployed;
it is a problem now shared by the middle class even, in some cases, the em-
ployed middle class.' Amazingly, the fastest growing segment of the newly
uninsured is the group that has been earning in excess of $75,000. 3 These
approximately 800,000 individuals (of the 1.2 million recently uninsured)
lost their health insurance when they lost their jobs or were priced out of the
market because of the rising cost of health insurance. And while there is
nominally federal protection for those whose loss of employment means a
loss of health insurance as well, both such programs-the COBRA program,
enacted as part of the Consolidated Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, and
HIPAA, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act-erect sub-
stantial procedural and economic barriers for the recently unemployed to ob-
tain health insurance.' The irony is that for many people who recently have
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law; B.A., Cornell University 1965;
J.D., California Western School of Law 1980; M.H.P., Harvard University 2001.
1. See John M. Broder, Problem of Lost Health Benefits is Reaching into the Middle
Class, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2002, at Al.
2. A recent article written by economist Karen Davis, President of the Commonwealth
Fund, entitled "Work In America: New Challenges for Health Care," the author states that
approximately 158 million Americans-nearly two out of three people under the age of 65-
have health insurance provided by their employers. KAREN DAVIS, COMMONWEALTH FUND,
WORK IN AMERICA: NEW CHALLENGES FOR HEALTH CARE 5 (Apr. 2002) (publication no. 521)
at http://www.cmwf.org/annreprt/2001/presmess.pdf.
3. Broder, supra note 1.
4. In order to qualify for both COBRA and HIPAA coverage, the employee must have
been employed by an employer that provided its employees with health insurance. The cost of
1
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become unemployed, COBRA and HIPAA provide no real protection
against the risk of illness or disease.5
To some extent, of course, the explanation for the phenomenon of the
uninsured in America is "the economy, stupid." The United States has been
experiencing an at least two-and-one-half year economic recession exacer-
bated by the economic effects of September 11, 2001, and, more recently,
the war in Iraq.6 For many reasons, the economy has not enjoyed as robust a
recovery as was once predicted so that many businesses have been forced to
lay off significant portions of their workforce in order to survive or, at least,
as a concession to the bottom line. These newly unemployed find themselves
not only without jobs, but too often without health insurance as well, adding
to the already growing numbers of uninsured in the country. In addition, the
rising cost of health insurance premiums (12% in 2001 and a projected 15%
in 2002) creates an additional burden for many employers, particularly small
employers, to continue providing health insurance for their employees. In
order to ensure their own economic survival, many businesses are cutting
back on health insurance as an employee benefit and are passing increasing
costs of health insurance to employees in the forms of higher premium
shares, less coverage for dependents, and higher cost-sharing. So, although
recent surveys by both the Employee Benefit Research Institute and the
Commonwealth Fund put health benefits first when ranking the importance
of employment fringe benefits, workers may find paradoxically that this
benefit is no longer provided or has been substantially reduced.7
The problem of the uninsured is a creature bred of a confluence of fac-
tors. Most individuals who are not covered under public health insurance
programs like Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP, have, as stated above, had
access to private insurance through their employment. Health insurance as an
employment benefit has been the norm since the 1950s due, in large part, to
the favorable income tax treatment accorded to employers who offer this
benefit to their employees.8 To a significant extent, access to health insur-
COBRA protection, which is effective for only 18 months, is 102% of the cost of coverage for
current employees which cost is fully borne by the insured. The guarantee of HIPAA is access
to individual insurance, but with no limit on the premiums that insurers can offer for such
coverage. In some cases, the cost of HIPAA health insurance is more than 200% of compara-
ble non-HIPAA policies.
5. See JACK A. MEYER & LARRY S. STEPNICK, COMMONWEALTH FUND, PORTABILITY OF
COVERAGE: HIPAA AND COBRA (Nov. 2002) (publication no. 569) at http://www.cmwf.
org/programs/insurance/meyer.hipaacobra ib_569.pdf.
6. On March 25, 2003, President Bush submitted a request to Congress for a fiscal year
2003 supplemental appropriation of $74.7 billion for funding of the invasion of Iraq and to
reward key allies. The President set an April I I deadline for completion. Congress approved
the President's request, increasing the 2003 budget deficit to a projected $400 billion. Earlier,
Congress approved a 10-year $760 million cut in income and corporate dividends taxes. This
week the Senate reversed itself by a narrow margin in favor of paring the tax cut by $350 bil-
lion.
7. WORK IN AMERICA: NEW CHALLENGES FOR HEALTH CARE, supra note 2, at 6.
8. In many ways, the employment based health insurance system is an artifact of the tax
[Vol. 39
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ance is an artifact of income; while only 6% of persons with an income in
excess of 300% of the federal poverty level are uninsured, 32% of persons
below the federal poverty level are uninsured.9 While about 20% of this dis-
parity can be attributed to unemployment, the remaining 80% of the unin-
sured are employed, but remain uninsured for other reasons.' ° Either their
employers do not offer insurance (60%), or, if the employer does offer insur-
ance, the employee is ineligible (11%) or does not participate in the group
insurance plan (22%)."
Some eligible employees do not participate in a group health insurance
plan because they have other, more attractive alternatives like a spouse's in-
surance plan. Others do not participate because it has simply become too ex-
pensive a preference. For families who earn less than 200% of federal pov-
erty level, approximately $35,000 for a family of four, purchasing a health
insurance policy can cost 10% of family income. 2 Considering the myriad
of expenses that a family of four has, health insurance is a luxury and "going
bare" may be a reluctant, but preferable option. The question of whether ac-
cess to health care should ever, in a civilized, wealthy country be a foregone
option is at the core of much of today's health care policy debate. The Insti-
tute of Medicine estimates that 18,000 people between the ages of 25 and 64
die each year because they lack health insurance making lack of health in-
surance the sixth-leading cause of death among people under age 65, a statis-
tic that many have called a national disgrace.' 3
code. Since post-WWII, employers have received a tax deduction for their payments toward
employee health insurance and such payments are excluded from the employees' taxable in-
come. As long as health insurance costs remained relatively low, these tax preferences were
perceived as beneficial to employers who were able to give their employees a tax-subsidized
increase in compensation. As health insurance costs have risen, the value of this employee
benefit to employees has gone up while its value to employers has fallen. See Jonathan Gruber
& Larry Levitt, Tax Subsidies for Health Insura ce: Costs and Benefits, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-
Feb. 2000, at 72 available at http://www.healthaffairs.org/readeragent.php?ID=/usr/ lo-
calapache/siteslhealthaffairs.org/htdocs/Libraryv 19n 1/s5.pdf.
9. In Critical Condition: America's Ailing Health Care System: Hearing Before the Sen-
ate Special Comm. On Aging, 108th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2003) (testimony of Karen Davis, Presi-
dent of The Commonwealth Fund) reprinted in KAREN DAVIS, COMMONWEALTH FUND, TIME
FOR CHANGE: THE HIDDEN COST OF A FRAGMENTED HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEM, Chart No. 3
(Document No. 622) at http://www.cmwf.org/programs/insurance/davissenatecom-
mitteetestimony_622.pdf (Mar. 10, 2003)[hereinafter TIME FOR CHANGE: TE HIDDEN COST
OF A FRAGMENTED HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEM].
10. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, SUMMARY OF A SHARED DESTINY: EFFECTS OF
UNINSURANCE ON INDIVIDUALS, FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES (Mar. 2003) at
http://www.iom.edu/iom/iomhome.nsf/Wfiles/Uninsured4final/$file/Uninsured4final.pdf
[hereinafter A SHARED DESTINY].
11. S. COLLINS, ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, ON THE EDGE: THE HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE OF Low-WAGE WORKERS FINDINGS FROM THE 2001 COMMONWEALTH
FUND HEALTH INSURANCE SURVEY (forthcoming, on file with author).
12. A SHARED DESTINY, supra note 10.
13. TIME FOR CHANGE: THE HIDDEN COST OF A FRAGMENTED HEALTH INSURANCE
SYSTEM, supra note 9.
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Initially, health insurance was strictly indemnity insurance that reim-
bursed providers of health care on the basis of services rendered to the em-
ployee-patient. Employers contracted with non-profit insurers like Blue
Cross/Blue Shield that were required by law to offer insurance for premiums
that were community rated as opposed to being experience rated or individu-
ally underwritten. 4 Community rating requires that the entire community,
however defined, be rated by the insurer as a whole with all participants
charged roughly the same premium for their health insurance regardless of
their personal health status and risk. The benefit of community rating to the
insured is that it generates lower premiums, particularly for high users of
health care, because of the effect of large numbers on the probability that the
insured risk will occur in any one member of the community. Premiums paid
by those who do not incur health care costs subsidize the costs of those with
a greater need for health care.
This cross-subsidization has a social insurance effect on health insur-
ance in that the cost of the insurance is, to a great extent, delinked from the
cost of care. Those members of a community rated insurance pool with a
demand for health care due to acute or chronic health conditions in excess of
their insurance premiums will have their health care costs subsidized by
those whose demand for health care is less than their insurance premiums.
Cross-subsidization is at the core of what Professor Deborah Stone calls a
mutual aid system, a community whose members share a definition of the
legitimate reasons for the redistribution of goods and services. 5 In a mutual
aid system, the members agree in what circumstances and to whom people
should give up something of their own and offer help. Although there is of-
ten disagreement over what circumstances trigger redistribution, in most so-
cieties sickness is just such a circumstance.' 6
In the United States, however, many policymakers, who Professor Uwe
Reinhardt identifies as belonging, ivi the main, to the insured elite, believe
that "rationing by price and ability to pay actually serves a greater national
purpose" by controlling the overuse of health care and the concomitant
cost.17 Citing Richard Epstein as a respected academic whose views on the
distribution of health care both reflect and bolster the views of the policy-
making elite, Professor Reinhardt quotes from an Epstein editorial published
in the New York Times: "We could do better with less regulation and less
subsidy. Scarcity matters, even in health care."' 8 Professor Epstein repre-
sents the view that health care is a commodity and that access to it should be
14. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
15. Deborah Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL'Y & L. 287, 289 (1993).
16. Id.
17. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Commentary, Wanted: A Clearly Articulated Social Ethic for
American Health Care, 278 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1446 (1997).
18. Id. (quoting Richard A. Epstein, Letter to the Editor, Healthcare Law Shows Big
Government Lives, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 10, 1997, § 4 (Magazine), at 14).
[Vol. 39
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controlled by the free market even if that means that as the cost of health
care rises, so do the ranks of those without access to health care. Admittedly,
subsidization of the kind advocated by Professors Reinhardt and Stone,
where resources are allocated to those in need without the ability to pay is
likely to result in a slower growth of national material wealth.' 9 The real
struggle of health care in the United States is that policymaking is caught in
a clash of ideological values: universal access versus wealth rationed access.
Each ideology has its benefits and burdens to which a society must be com-
mitted. Where the commitment has not been made, as in the United States,
exogenous factors can exert an enormous influence on policymaking.
One of the commonly accepted burdens of universal access is cost 20 so
that when health care costs rise, the policy pendulum tends to swing in the
direction of wealth rationed health care. The 1970s and 1980s saw an explo-
sion of health care costs driven by increasingly more sophisticated technolo-
gies, higher cost treatments, increases in the numbers and costs of prescrip-
tion drugs, and overuse of the health care system due to perverse incentives
in both the health insurance and reimbursement schemes. In 1980, the United
States spent $600 billion on health care; estimates are that we spent $1.5 tril-
lion in 2002, approximately 14.5% of GDP.2' Health insurance premiums
grew correlatively. Initially, the brunt of these increases was felt by employ-
ers who had been providing health benefits in the form of insurance premi-
ums threatening the viability of the private health insurance paradigm. The
change from a service reimbursement model to a managed care model was
intended to promote competition in health insurance and induce providers to
not inappropriately overuse health care. Those who could provide health care
most efficiently, both from the standpoint of cost and, presumably quality
would prevail in a competitive marketplace because of employers' economic
incentives.
Once a competitive marketplace in health insurance arose, participating
health plans naturally wanted to compete profitably. In order to do this, plans
began experience rating their insurance pools, i.e., rating on the basis of risk
experience, rather than using community rating.22 Because plans were not
permitted to individually underwrite health insurance policies, they relied on
a number of proxies for risk such as age and socioeconomic status, as well as
past actual health care usage. Experience rating provided an incentive for the
health plans to attract the healthiest populations that would utilize the least
19. Id. at 1447.
20. See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
21. Stephen Heftier et al., Health Spending Projections for 2002-2012, HEALTH AFF.,
Mar.-Apr. 2003, http://www.healthaffairs.orglWebExclusives/2202Heffler.pdf (Feb. 7, 2003).
22. Community rated health insurance is the centerpiece of almost every proposal for
increasing access to health care. This is true whether the reform envisions a single-payer or a
competitive marketplace. The community rate is defined as the rate charged by a competitive
insurer for a person of average risk for a standardized benefits package. John F. Holahan, Len
M. Nichols & Linda J. Blumberg, Expanding Health Insurance Coverage, in URBAN IN-
STITUTE, COVERING AM.-REAL REMEDIES FOR THE UNINSURED, 103 (June 1, 2002).
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amount of health care leaving the sickest populations to some other plan.23
The generally more favorable treatment accorded to self-funded employee
benefit plans by ERISA (the Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act),
motivated many large employers to take themselves out of the health insur-
ance community, another adverse selection phenomenon that has caused in-
surance premiums to employers who are not self-funded to rise.24
What happens when an insurance marketplace becomes competitive is
that insurers are motivated to increasingly segment the pool of insureds in
order to match health insurance premiums to the risk of health care use.
Many employers who had borne much of the cost of health insurance in the
past have either elected not to provide their employees with health insurance
or to shift the cost of the insurance to the employee. The irony of this seg-
mentation in a health insurance marketplace is that those individuals who
most need health insurance, i.e., the chronically ill or those with pre-existing
conditions, may be locked out of the market because they simply cannot af-
ford the cost.2 This so-called "actuarial fairness" model26 makes complete
sense for the competitive insurer whose economic interest is best served by
excluding individuals with a high probability of high usage of health care. It
also makes sense for the insured elite, i.e., those persons who can afford the
increasingly higher cost or share of cost of health care. But the logic and
methods of actuarial fairness mean denying insurance to those who most
23. For example, a health plan might offer a set of benefits that more heavily reimburse
preventive care over prolonged hospital stays on the theory that healthier individuals, rather
than sicker individuals, are more likely to enroll in such a plan. This so-called adverse selec-
tion means that the sicker populations are more likely to select a plan that emphasizes hospital
stays or expensive and more frequent medical treatments. The latter plan is more likely to in-
cur greater costs than the former and be less profitable; in order to be profitable, it must raise
its premium costs pricing certain segments of the unhealthy population out of the insurance
market.
24. ERISA, the federal law regulating employee benefits including health benefits, per-
mits employers to avoid state insurance premium taxes, state benefits mandates and other spe-
cial taxes used to subsidize uncompensated care and high-risk pools. Self-insured plans need
not hold reserves or meet solvency standards and, under ERISA, workers have less recourse
to redress grievances about plan administration. Robert A. Berenson, Beyond Competition,
HEALTH AFF., Mar. -Apr. 1997, at 171-72 at http://www.healthaffairs.org/ reader-
agent.php?ID=/usr/local/apache/sites/healthaffairs.org/htdocs/Library/vI 6n2/s23.pdf.
25. While it certainly is true that choosing to purchase health insurance with available
income is an exercise of individual preferences, it is also true that preference is constrained by
income. Those with limited incomes may not have a real choice with regard to health insur-
ance, however much they might choose to have such insurance. The 12/3/02 TOTN was on
the rising numbers of uninsured in America and quoted the statistic that the average cost of
health insurance to a family of four in 2002 is $8,000.
26. See generally Stone, supra note 15, at 287.
27. In an actuarial fairness model, the cost of health insurance is directly linked to health
care usage. For those participants whose risk of usage is high, the cost of procuring health in-
surance will be high. But for those whose health care usage risk is low, the cost of health in-
surance will be correlatively low.
[Vol. 39
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need medical care; therefore the consequences to individuals who are priced
out of the group market may be grave.28
Left outside an insurance pool, their choices are very limited. In most
states, insurers are permitted to medically underwrite persons applying for
individual health insurance. While very few Americans are truly uninsurable
because of their health condition or history, a 2001 Henry J. Kaiser Family
Foundation study of medical underwriting practices suggests that many
Americans with only mild health problems are turned down by health insur-
ers. 29 For those who qualify for individual health insurance, the premiums
will be higher and the coverage more meager than comparable group insur-
ance.
Rochester, New York, a community cited in 1992 by then-President
Clinton, as a model of health care is a cogent example of how universal ac-
cess to health care can be impacted when a community's health insurance
market becomes competitive and insurance risk pools become segmented. In
1992, Rochester was acknowledged to have a much more cost-effective
health care system with substantially lower costs, better insurance coverage,
and much better access to care than in the rest of the country.3° Rochester's
remarkable success was the result, in large part, of the cooperation among
the most important players in the health insurance and delivery scheme:
Rochester's big employers, its dominant insurer (Blue Cross, Blue Shield of
Rochester) and its-provider community. Instead of segmenting the insurance
market on an actuarial fairness model, Rochester developed a so-called uni-
form or all-payer system that prevented the cream-skimming and adverse se-
lection in insurance coverage.3
Then Eastman Kodak, the largest employer in Rochester, elected the
ERISA option of self-funding its group health insurance benefit and with-
drew from the community insurance pool taking with it tens of thousands of
healthy young employees. As City Newspaper's columnist Joan Collins
Lambert put it, "Kodak had broken the all-for-one, one-for-all approach to
health care in favor of an each-man-for-himself philosophy."32 While Roch-
ester's record on health care is still exemplary relative to the rest of the
country, some feel that there is reason to fear that Rochester's much-
acknowledged managed cooperation health care model is at risk. Humphrey
28. Id. at 308.
29. Karen Pollitz & Richard Sorian, Ensuring Health Security: Is the Individual Market
Ready for Prime Time, HEALTH AFF., Oct. 23, 2002 http://www.healthaffairs.org/ WebExclu-
sives/2106Pollitz.pdf.
30. HarrisInteractive, Rochester, NY Health Care System Still a Model for Success (Mar.
27, 2001) available at http://www.Harrisinteractive.com/news/allnewsbydate. asp?
NewslD=256.
31. id.
32. FIRST UNITARIAN CHURCH OF ROCHESTER, Is HEALTH CARE A COMMODITY? IS
EVERYTHIING FOR SALE? http://www.rochesterunitarian.org/1999-2000/20000326.html (quot-
ing Joan Collins Lambert, Can This Health Care System be Saved? CITY NEWSPAPER, July 7-
13, 1999, at 8).
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Taylor, chairman of The Harris Poll, HarrisInteractive, has commented, "If
they behave as they are beginning to, more like the rest of the nation, health
care in Rochester may look much more like health care elsewhere-i.e. more
uninsured, higher costs, and greater dissatisfaction. ' 33
More recently, the growing backlash against managed care has contrib-
uted to the rise in the cost of health insurance. Health plans afraid of losing
business because of public perceptions that they are engaged in so-called
health care rationing, have decided to loosen the reins of utilization review
and allow patients independent access to specialists and specialist care. This
concession to "customer satisfaction" is likely to be expensive to the health
plan and will not come without a correlative cost in the form of an increased
premium. In addition, the issue of health care quality is undergoing a quiet
but persistent revolution. 34 There is empirical evidence to suggest that poor
quality, most particularly institutional quality health care leads to "at least
44,000 and perhaps as many as 98,000 deaths per year." 35The cost of
"cleaning up the system" is estimated to be "between $17 and $29 billion"
annually, a cost that will translate into higher costs of care that will eventu-
ally reach the consumer in the form of higher health insurance premi-
ums. 36One of the arguments in favor of retaining the existing competitive,
multi-payer system is that, although expensive,37 the health care system in
the United States is the best in the world. In 2002, the estimated cost per
capita for health care was $5,427 with the government's share being
$3,245.38 In 1998, the cost of health care in the United States was more than
twice as much measured both per capita and as a percentage of GDP than the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") me-
dian and far more than its closest competitor, Switzerland.39 So it is clear
that far more money is spent on health care in the United States than in any
other industrialized country. A cogent question is: what is the quid pro quo
for this large expenditure of GDP? Much depends on agreement as to what
constitutes a good health care system. A system that is rated only by those
with affordable access to it will value measurements such as quality of care,
the good health of its population, ease of use, and technological capability.
33. Rochester, NY Health Care System Still a Model for Success, supra note 30, at 3.
34. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT BRIEF, To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER
HEALTH SYSTEM (Nov. 1999) at http://books.nap.edu/html/to err-is-human/reportbrief.pdf.
35. Id. at 1.
36. Id.
37. In 2002, $110 billion was devoted to health insurance administrative costs alone.
TIME FOR CHANGE: THE HIDDEN COST OF A FRAGMENTED HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEM, supra
note 9, at 17.
38. See BUREAU OF LABOR EDUCATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MAINE, THE U.S. HEALTH
CARE SYSTEM: BEST IN THE WORLD, OR JUST THE MOST EXPENSIVE?, at 2 n.4 available at
http://dll.umaine.edu/ble/U.S.%20HCweb.pdf (Summer 2001) (citing OECD, OECD Health
Data 2000: A Comparative Analysis of Twenty-nine Countries (Paris: IECD, 2000)).
39. Id. at 3, figure 1.
[Vol. 39
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For those to whom access is effectively denied because of lack of afforda-
bility, these measurements mean little.
Certainly one could argue that the measurements of a good health care
system must look also to overall good health, i.e., the health of all citizens, a
fair distribution of good health, a fair distribution of responsiveness across
population groups, and a fair distribution of financing health care.4 A health
care system that excludes a significant percentage of the population arguably
should not be considered good and certainly cannot be considered fair. And
yet the United States' health care system, the most expensive in the world,
excludes approximately 43 million people by making access to health care a
function of price and income.41
The result of a system that excludes 43 million people completely and at
least another 20 million sometime during the year is just as one might ex-
pect. While the insured are generally entitled to excellent care, the uninsured
lack access to a full range of preventive, chronic and acute care services that
are an important predicate of better health and longer life.42 Access to good
and consistent health care has not only individual effects, but family and
community effects as well. The effect of a serious illness for one member of
an insured family is severe, to be sure, but is not as likely to have serious
economic consequences to the whole family as the same event in an unin-
sured family. Uninsured families, who pay more than 40% of their medical
costs by themselves, tend to use far fewer health services, often waiting until
a crisis occurs. While such behavior may save money in the short run, the
long-term costs of serious illness can be far greater.43 A recent study esti-
mates that an uninsured individual's earnings are 15-20% lower than a com-
parable insured individual because of decreased productivity due to illness.4W
Lowered productivity inures, of course, to the detriment of employers whose
productivity is also adversely affected. The ill effects of lack of access to
health care ripples from individuals to families to societies.
A related and equally serious issue is the cost of uncompensated care.
When an uninsured person or family cannot pay for expensive emergency
health care, who picks up the cost of care? The answer is, of course, that we
40. Id. at 1. See also WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT
2000-HEALTH SYSTEMS: IMPROVING PERFORMANCE (Geneva: WHO, 2000).
41. It has been argued that emergency care is available even to those outside the system
through federal legislation such as the EMTALA (Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor
Act) which requires that all hospitals with emergency departments provide a modicum of care
(diagnosis and stabilizing) to any person regardless of health insurance status. Providers who
used to subsidize care for the uninsured through higher payments from the insured or other-
wise paying patient population have lost the wherewithal to do so because of harder bargain-
ing by health plans which leave providers little overage with which to subsidize.
42. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE REPORT BRIEF, CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE: Too LITTLE, Too
LATE (May 2002) at http://books.nap.edu/html/care-without/reportbrief.pdf.
43. A SHARED DESTINY, supra note 10.
44. JACK HADLEY, KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, SICKER AND
POORER: THE CONSEQUENCES OF BEING UNINSURED (2002) available at http://www.kff.org/
content2002/20020510/4004.pdf (May 2002), at 1, 81-82, 84-85.
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all do. As the Institute of Medicine report on the effects of uninsurance
states, "The unreimbursed costs of caring for uninsured Americans are ulti-
mately paid for by higher taxes and higher prices for services and insurance.
Local communities tend to bear the main economic burden of subsidizing
service delivery, while the costs of public insurance are more broadly spread
across state and federal budgets."45 However, as the federal and state budget
surpluses of the last decade of the 20h century give way to the budget defi-
cits of the first decade of the 2 1st century,. this subsidy cushion is quickly
disappearing. In 2001, the cost to the system of caring for the uninsured is
estimated to have been $40.6 billion, $24 billion of which was borne by pro-
viders.46 When providers are uncompensated, they often reduce access to
services such as "clinic-based primary care, specialty health services, and
hospital-based care, particularly emergency medical services and trauma
care, [which] may also result in lessened availability of other primary and
preventive care and the closure or privatization of community hospitals." 7
Covering the costs of uncompensated care is but one example of how a
fragmented health insurance system shifts the cost of care. As Karen Davis,
economist and president of The Commonwealth Fund, explains, in a multi-
payer system, there are many paths to health care coverage: employer-based
coverage which accounts for 160 million people, public health insurance
programs like Medicare (39 million people) and Medicaid (40 million peo-
ple), and individual health insurance plans that provide coverage for about
15 million people. 8 As health care costs rise, it is in the interest of any payer
to shift the cost of care to someone else; in a multi-payer system, "passing
the buck" is both possible and desirable. Passing the buck is exactly what
employers who shift the cost of health insurance to their employees are do-
ing. Employees who either choose not to or cannot pick up the additional
cost share become part of the growing numbers of uninsured Americans.
A fragmented health insurance system where passing the buck is the
name of the game increases the probability of adverse consequences to indi-
viduals, families and society in the form of higher administrative costs, more
uncompensated care, and greater numbers of uninsured individuals. The state
of the health insurance system and indeed, the health care system in America
today is, in large part, the result of the choice, whether conscious or negli-
gent, to ration health care by price and wealth. As Professor Deborah Stone
notes, a long-standing public policy that has encouraged competition and a
market economy has "so deeply embedded" the principle of actuarial fair-
ness in the health insurance structure that it will be harder than one might
45. A SHARED DESTINY, supra note 10.
46. Jack Hadley & John Holahan, How Much Medical Care Do the Uninsured Use, and
Who Pays for it? HEALTH AFF., at http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/2202Hadley.
pdf (Feb. 12, 2003).
47. A SHARED DESTINY, supra note 10
48. TIME FOR CHANGE: THE HIDDEN COST OF A FRAGMENTED HEALTH INSURANCE
SYSTEM, supra note 9.
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suppose to eradicate it.49 Since the ideology of subsidization runs exactly
counter to the principle of actuarial fairness, it is difficult to imagine that
universal coverage could be realized. But a confluence of forces, many of
which have been discussed, may create a "perfect storm" strong enough to
overcome the inertial resistance of the status quo.50
II COME THE REVOLUTION?
In a recent commentary in the Journal of the American Medical Asso-
ciation, Professor Uwe Reinhardt baldly illustrates the ideological debate of
American health care by choosing the hardest case. "As a matter of national
policy, and to the extent that a nation's health system can make it possible,
should the child of a poor American family have the same chance of avoid-
ing preventable illness or of being cured from a given illness as does the
child of a rich American family?"51 Framing the issue of affordable access to
health care this starkly should force us to directly confront the moral, equita-
ble and social components of health care. And while it would be socially ir-
responsible and politically impossible to ignore the financial impact of say-
ing yes to Professor Reinhardt's question, is it not equally socially
irresponsible and even politically immoral to say no?
Since the publication of Professor Reinhardt's commentary, the num-
bers of Americans excluded from affordable health care has grown to in-
clude, as John Broder's New York Times article illustrates, the working mid-
dle class. While that change makes Professor Reinhardt's access to
affordable health care dilemma somewhat less morally shocking, as a matter
of class warfare it makes it eminently more politically exigent. When mem-
bers of a more politically powerful group suffer a diminution in access to
health care, they are more likely to experience the loss as one of a perceived
preexisting right.52 The irony is that there has never been a political consen-
sus in the United States about the status of health care as a right of citizen-
ship or a market commodity.53 Nonetheless, it is not unlikely that the middle
class will experience the loss of it as the loss of a right. The more relevant
question to health care policy is whether the fear that their health and the
49. Stone, supra note 15, at 313.
50. JOEL E. MILLER, NAT'L COALITION ON HEALTH CARE, A PERFECT STORM: THE CON-
FLUENCE OF FORCES AFFECTING HEALTH CARE COVERAGE, (Nov. 2001) at
http://www.nchc.org/APerfectStorm.pdf.
51. Reinhardt, supra note 17, at 446.
52. The tendency of Americans to frame social issues in terms of individual rights has
engendered a growing body of literature. Professor Mary Ann Glendon persuasively argues
that rights talk elevates the interests of individuals over the interests of communities and, in so
doing, impoverishes political discourse about societal values. "A kind of blind spot seems to
float across our political vision where the communal and social, as distinct from individual or
strictly economic, dimensions of a problem are concerned." MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS
TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 112 (The Free Press, 1991) (1993).
53. Stone, supra note 15, at 288.
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health of their families will be compromised and their indignation at the loss
of a perceived right will translate into political power sufficient to change
the status quo.
There is, to the extent possible, at a time when the United States is wag-
ing an expensive war on terror and governments at all levels are experienc-
ing severe budget deficits, a surprisingly broad coalition weighing in on the
future of health care. This coalition ranges from the Bush Administration's
support of a market-based Medicare prescription drug benefit that would in-
ure only to Medicare beneficiaries who participate in Medicare+Choice 4 to
a multitude of initiatives supporting some form of a universal health insur-
ance;55 two proposals that are on opposite ends of the health care ideological
spectrum. Although the universal health insurance proposals differ, some of
them radically with regard to how to get the job done, the unifying principle
of all these movements is inclusiveness. "Affordable health care for all" is
the rallying cry. 6 The mandate with seemingly the greatest momentum and
the broadest appeal is a change from a multi-payer to a single-payer system,
based on what appears to be compelling evidence that the administrative and
other non-health care costs of a multiple payer system are crippling, unpro-
ductive and unnecessary. 7
An ironic consequence of the momentum in favor of a single-payer sys-
tem is that the multiple player constituency, most particularly private insur-
ers, has joined the ranks of those in favor of extending coverage to as many
as possible. A recent article in the Business Section of the New York Times
entitled "Some Tentative First Steps Toward Universal Health Care" de-
scribes not single-payer legislation, but rather steps that the private health
insurers, fearful that mounting numbers of uninsured will inevitably lead to
54. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 added a Part C, Medicare+Choice, to Medicare in
order to expand the choices of Medicare beneficiaries beyond traditional Medicare indemnity
insurance to various managed care options. The impetus for this legislation was the increasing
cost burden to the federal government of insuring the health care of Americans age 65 and
older. Medicare+Choice was intended to shift the burden of senior health insurance from the
public to the private sector.
55. The groups supporting some form of universal health insurance range from physician
groups to various states single payer movements to private health insurers like Blue Cross.
56. A measure of the broad base of this movement is the recent Cover the Uninsured
Week sponsored by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation generated a significant amount of
optimism from all parts of the ideological spectrum. Columnist David Broder of the Washing-
ton Post writes that while the struggle to "reach agreement" on any significant health care leg-
islation "so far has yielded more frustration than results," Cover the Uninsured Week "did not
try to define a solution.. their message was that this is a problem that cannot be ignored."
David S. Broder, Editorial, Health Care Hopes, WASH. POsT.COM, Mar. 16, 2003, at B7 at
www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentld=A27802-2003
Marl4& notfound=true.
57. "The Congressional Budget Office projects that a national single-payer system would
reduce overall health costs by $225 billion by 2004 despite the expansion of comprehensive
care to all Americans." PHYSICIANS FOR A NATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAM (PNHP), SINGLE-
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single-payer legislation that will threaten the continued viability of the pri-
vate insurance market, are taking to maintain the status quo.58 Some health
insurers are developing products with slimmer coverage and lower premi-
ums; others are pressing state legislators to raise the cigarette tax to subsi-
dize basic coverage. "Dr. William W. McGuire, chief executive of the Unit-
edHealthGroup, the largest private insurer, has written to every member of
Congress calling for 'essential health care for all Americans."
59
While the private sector certainly is seeking a public relations bonanza
by endorsing a more comprehensive approach to access to health care, its
business interests are advanced by its advocacy of universal coverage. Rising
health insurance premiums and a shift from employers to employees means
that more people, often the young and healthy, who gamble on their lower
probability of illness, are dropping health insurance as an employee benefit
leaving the older, sicker (and wealthier) in the risk pool. This adverse selec-
tion means that the risk pool is not as broad as it once was and increases the
potential of higher costs to health plans creating an ever-increasing need to
raise the cost of premiums. All of the plans advocated by the private health
insurance sector seek to bring the younger and healthier back into the risk
pool thereby reversing the adverse selection phenomenon. "If we don't do
something in a darn hurry about the uninsured, the whole health care system
in this country is going to collapse and the government will step in," said
Chuck Butler, a vice president of Blue Cross Blue Shield of Montana. 60
The last time momentum built for universal coverage was during the
late 1980s and 1990s when similar forces existed. The numbers of uninsured
steadily increased during the 1980s and the 1990-1991 economic recession
caused consumers to worry about the risks of losing coverage.6' Then, as to-
day, rising health care costs caused concern among employers, particularly
small employers, about the cost of employee benefits. Former university
president and Democrat, Harris Wofford's wholly unexpected 1991 triumph
over Republican Richard Thornburg, a two-time former governor of Penn-
sylvania, to fill the Pennsylvania Senate seat vacated by the untimely death
of Republican John Heinz, epitomized the changing political climate. 6 Wof-
ford was so impressed with the importance of ensuring all Americans access
to affordable health care that the tag line for his campaign was: "[i]f crimi-
nals have the right to a lawyer, I think working Americans should have the
58. Milt Freudenheim, N.Y. TIMES, Some Tentative First Steps Toward Universal Health
Care, Dec. 7, 2002, at C1.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Linda T. Bilheimer & David C. Colby, Expanding Coverage: Reflections on Recent
Efforts, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 83 available at 2001 WL 10696847.
62. Dale Russakof, How Wofford Rode Healthcare to Washington, WASH. POST.
(Weekly Ed.), Nov. 25-Dec.I, 1991, at 14, 15.
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right to a doctor."63 Bill Clinton and the Democrats rode to victory in 1992
partly on the wave of comprehensive health reform.
When the Clinton pay-or-play Health Security Act64 was defeated in
1994, the states undertook the task of expanding health insurance coverage
to more at-risk populations. Some states took advantage of options provided
by the federal government to expand Medicaid coverage to more adults. The
enactment of SCHIP (State Children's Health Insurance Program) in 1997,
in which all states are currently participating, provided extended coverage
for previously uninsured children who, in 1995 made up a full 25% of unin-
sured Americans.65 But today, staggering state budget deficits already
threaten to unravel the public health insurance safety net created by the
states over the past seven or so years. Although the rise in the numbers of
uninsured Americans in 2002 was due to loss of private insurance, in the
coming year, public coverage is likely to erode as states seek to cut budget
deficits by restricting public insurance programs such as Medicaid and
SCHIP.66
So the traditional impetuses for universal or at least more comprehen-
sive health insurance coverage exist again today. Of course, the other side of
the universal coverage coin is the public cost of providing this coverage that
continues to increase as more and more Americans lose their private health
insurance. If universal coverage will require, as it surely will, an increase in
public subsidies as well as increases in private cross-subsidization, it will be
a hard sell to a voting polity, the majority of whom are currently insured, and
therefore not likely to immediately benefit from universal coverage. And
given the predilection of the current administration to spend money abroad
rather than fund social programs at home,67 it would be a real turn-about for
the administration to be amenable to a publicly subsidized universal health
insurance program. There are, however, a number of vocal and powerful
members of the current health care system who argue that the so-called pri-
63. HAYNES JOHNSON & DAVID BRODER, THE SYSTEM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF POLITICS
AT THE BREAKING POINT 601 (Little, Brown, & Co. 1996).
64. The Health Security Act, built on a preexisting employment-based structure, pay-or-
play, required employers to provide health insurance to their employees or pay into a fund
that would provide health insurance to employees. A similar employer pay-or-play approach
forms the basis for SB2, a comprehensive health insurance bill sponsored by CA state senator
John Burton (D).
65. EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, ISSUE BRIEF No. 179 SOURCES OF HEALTH
AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNINSURED: ANALYSIS OF THE MARCH 1996 CURRENT
POPULATION SURVEY (Nov. 1996).
66. TIME FOR CHANGE: THE HIDDEN COST OF A FRAGMENTED HEALTH INSURANCE
SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 5.
67. As noted above, President Bush asked Congress to supplement the 2003 federal
budget by, at least initially, $74.7 billion to pay for the war in Iraq. Congress already ap-
proved the President's $760 billion 10-year tax cut. The projected budget deficit for 2003
hovers around $400 billion. Given this administration's preference for private market solu-
tions to public problems, the likelihood of appropriating public money to fund the cost of uni-
versal access to health care seems remote.
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vate health care system in the United States is really a mixed system in
which the government already plays a prominent role. 68
Drs. Steffie Woolhandler and David Himmelstein, both associate pro-
fessors of medicine at Harvard Medical School and founders of Physicians
for a National Health Program,69 a nationwide group with more than 9,000
members, have written extensively to demonstrate that the cost to the gov-
ernment of funding national health insurance would not be nearly as great as
most Americans believe. While the direct spending by the government is
above the radar screen,70 approximately 15% more of current health care
spending is below the radar screen in the form of health care related tax sub-
sidies and public employees' health benefits. 71 The result, they estimate, is
that a full 60% of current spending on health in the United States is already
subsidized by taxes.72 For example, while employer payments to health in-
surers and providers on behalf of their employees are popularly character-
ized as "private," these payments are subsidized by taxes and are therefore
more properly attributable to both private and public financing. Employers
deduct, as a business expense, payments made as part of an employee bene-
fits plan and, correlatively, employees are not required to recognize such
payments as income. When the government grants these tax preferences to
insured individuals, it either redistributes economic privilege or income from
other taxpayers. The argument is that these redistributions are a form of "tax
financing" on behalf of individuals who are so-called privately insured.73
68. Jonathan Oberlander, Perspective: Are Americans Closer Than We Think to National
Health Insurance? HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 2002 at 103 available at 2002 WL 12361292.
69. Physicians for a National Health Program (PNHP) "is a not-for-profit organization of
physicians, medical students, and other health care professionals that support a national health
insurance program." The organization advocates in favor of "a single-payer system (where the
government finances health care, but keeps the delivery of health care in mostly private con-
trol) [as] the only solution to solving the United States' many health care problems" including
the problem of "43 million uninsured Americans, skyrocketing health insurance premiums,"
"and relatively poor health indicators compared to similar industrialized nations." PHYSICIANS
FOR A NAT'L HEALTH PROG., HOME PAGE, at http://www.pnhp.org/. The list of PNHP mem-
bers reads like a "Who's Who in American Medicine."
70. In 1999, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services estimated that that the gov-
ernment's share of health spending in the United States was 45.3 percent. CENTERS FOR MEDI-
CARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES By TYPE OF SERVICE AND
SOURCE OF FUNDS: CALENDAR YEARS 1960-99, available at www.hcfa.gov/stats/nhe-
oact/tables/nhe99.csv (Nov. 12, 2001).
71. Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Paying for National Health Insur-
ance-and Not Getting it, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 2002 at 88 available at 2002 WL
12361289.
72. Tax-financed health spending in the United States now exceeds total spending on
medical care in all countries except Switzerland.
73. The authors use the example of an employer who pays $6,000 toward an employee's
health insurance premium or cost of care. Since the employee is not required to recognize the
$6,000, she saves $2779 in taxes. If the government wishes to balance its budget, it must
make up for this loss of revenue either by reducing its spending on other programs to the det-
riment of the beneficiaries of that program, or alternatively, raising the taxes of other taxpay-
ers. Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra note 71.
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Drs. Woolhandler and Himmelstein argue that the enormous cost of ad-
ministering a multi-payer system is added to the already publicly subsidized
health spending, the costs of universal health insurance may be less than tax-
payers, fearful of huge tax increases, might expect. Even skeptics of national
health insurance agree that "U.S. health care costs need not rise under na-
tional health insurance because administrative savings would roughly offset
the increased costs of care for today's uninsured and underinsured per-
sons."74 Drs. Woolhandler and Himmelstein estimate that the cost to the
government of getting us from here to there would be approximately
$130,000 billion per year, the amount of the current employee tax exclu-
sion.75 So if Drs. Woolhandler and Fimmelstein are right, why aren't we al-
ready there?
Professor Jonathan Oberlander, a professor of social medicine at Uni-
versity of North Carolina Medical School, says that even though the 60%
public share of health spending in the United States is within sight of the
70% public share of health spending subsidized by the Canadian government
to maintain its single-payer health system, the likelihood of closing that 10%
gap and realizing a single-payer universal health insurance system in the
United States is small. He believes that the divide between the economic
significance of raising taxes and the political significance of raising taxes
will halt the progress of national health insurance in its tracks. "Raising in-
come or payroll taxes to fund national health insurance imposes a visible
cost on Americans, a cost that so far taxpayers have shown little willingness
to fund."76 This statement illustrates, as clearly as any can, the philosophical
"struggle for the soul of health insurance" in America.77 Can insured Ameri-
cans agree that access to health care is a basic right to which we are all enti-
tled regardless of income, employment, or health status and, more impor-
tantly, agree to directly subsidize the cost of that right through increased
taxes? Professor Oberlander says no, at least not yet. So if national health in-
surance is not yet ready for prime time, are there other ways to increase the
inclusiveness of access to health care?
A recent Robert Wood Johnson Foundation initiative, "Covering Amer-
ica," asked prominent experts in health policy to analyze the various options
for expanding health insurance coverage. Urban Institute researchers more
fully developed two of the ten proposals submitted to the "Covering Amer-
ica" initiative. One of the proposals, "Expanding Health Insurance Cover-
age," builds on the existing federal/state Medicaid and SCHIP structures but
provides more generous federal funding. The second developed proposal,
74. J.F. SHELLS & R. A. HAUGHT, THE VERMONT HRSA STATE FUNDING GRANT, OFFICE
OF VERMONT HEALTH ACCESS, ANALYSIS OF THE COSTS AND IMPACT OF UNIVERSAL HEALTH
CARE COVERAGE UNDER A SINGLE PAYER MODEL FOR THE STATE OF VERMONT (Lewin Group,
Aug. 2001) available at http://www.dsw.state.vt.us/districts/ovha/AnalysoftheCosts.pdf.
75. Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra note 71.
76. Are Americans Closer Than We Think to National Health Insurance?, supra note 68.
77. Stone, supra note 15.
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crafted by Alan Weil,78 an Urban Institute researcher, is entitled "The Medi-
cal Security System: A Proposal to Ensure Health Insurance Coverage for
All Americans" (the "MSS"). "
The MSS Plan, like Drs. Woolhandler and Himmelstein's, proposes
converting the current employee tax exclusion to a new payroll tax that
would be used to fund basic health insurance for all employed people and
their dependents. Like the current Social Security and Medicare payroll tax,
the payroll tax used to fund the MSS would be shared by employers and em-
ployees.8" Employers could opt out of the payroll tax by continuing to pro-
vide and pay a significant portion of health insurance premiums for their
employees.8 Other funding sources, such as the funds currently allocated to
Medicaid's low-income and adult component and the SCHIP program,
would be available to fund health insurance for the unemployed.
Although the financing and universal access components of the two
proposals are similar, the proposals are different operationally. Drs. Wool-
handler and Himmelstein as well as Physicians for a National Health Pro-
gram (PN-LP) endorse an American national health insurance in the Cana-
dian single-payer style. This universal health insurance program would be an
expansion of the current Medicare program and, like Medicare, would guar-
antee all Americans a basic health benefits package. As it does with the cur-
rent Medicare program, Congress would appropriate amounts for the pro-
gram's annual budget to include payments for providers, both physicians and
institutions, capitation payments to health plans and administrative expenses.
While the financing, pricing, reimbursement and administrative aspects of
this national health insurance system would be public, the provision of care
would remain in the hands of the private sector.
Under the Medical Security System, all Americans under the age of 65
who do not have access to health insurance through their employers would
be eligible for a no-cost basic benefits health plan and could purchase
higher-cost coverage if they chose. Unlike the American national health in-
surance plan, the MSS does not dismantle the current Medicare system but
rather operates alongside it. The MSS would operate using managed compe-
tition principles8 2 through health insurance exchanges that serve to organize
78. Alan R. Weil, J.D., M.P.P., is Director of the Assessing the New Federalism project
at the Urban Institute.
79. Alan R. Weil, The Medical Security System: A Proposal to Ensure Health Insurance
Coverage for All Americans, in URBAN INSTITUTE, COVERING AM.-REAL REMEDIES FOR THE
UNINSURED 175 (July 1, 2002).
80. Weil suggests that an employer contribution of 7.7% and an employee contribution
of 3.3% of the Social Security wage base would generate approximately the amount spent on
private insurance premiums and would distribute the costs between employers and employees
in accordance with the national average contributions for family coverage. Id.
81. This type of financing structure was known as "pay-or-play" in the Clinton Health
Security Act.
82. Managed competition is a market-oriented approach to health care reform which fo-
cuses on correcting the asymmetry of the health insurance market by creating so-called
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the health insurance market.83 Exchanges themselves would not bear insur-
ance risk, but would contract with private licensed health plans that would be
required to offer health insurance at community rates. Exchanges would not
be permitted to refuse to enroll any eligible person, defined as any resident
within the geographic area that the exchange serves.84 Enrollees would be
eligible at no additional cost for a basic benefits package but, could choose
an enhanced benefits package for an additional premium. Under the MSS,
the government would need to decide on a process for making payments to
licensed exchanges. Among other matters, this process would require the
government to determine how payments should be risk-adjusted to account
for health status, a process that has been articulated as one of the primary
reasons for the failure of managed care in the current Medicare program. 85
While the MSS values the universality of health insurance in that no
person can be denied access to health care as a function of cost or income, it
also creates an option for individual preferences that may very well be a
function of cost and income. It also values the role of competition. Health
exchanges are paid a risk capitated fee per enrollee by the federal govern-
ment, a fee determined by the cost of providing a specific benefits package.
The health exchanges then enter into risk contracts with multiple health in-
surers who contract with providers. Under the MSS, the government is the
guarantor of access to health care for all Americans under the age of 65 re-
gardless of health, wealth or employment status. However, the MSS is not a
single-payer system. Although the federal government is the sole payer to
the health exchanges, the competitive health exchange and health plan com-
ponents make the MSS a multiple-payer system with regard to providers.
Presumably, competition will determine which health exchanges will survive
in the health exchange marketplace as well as operate to drive down the
costs of procuring health insurance and care.
"sponsors" to perform the same functions for consumers as employers currently do: research-
ing the health insurance marketplace and structuring purchasing options. The sponsor would
then prepare for consumers a menu of available benefits packages options which would be
required to be standardized. See generally ALAIN ENTHOVAN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
MANAGED COMPETITION IN HEALTH CARE FINANCE (1988).
83. Weil describes the health insurance exchange as loosely based on the stock exchange.
Stock exchanges create a marketplace for highly regulated goods, securities, by attracting
buyers and sellers to the market. Health insurance exchanges would create a marketplace in
what will be a regulated good, health insurance, and will succeed only if they can attract both
buyers and sellers. Health insurance will be regulated in the sense that health exchanges must
provide all nationally standardized basic benefits packages, including at least one no-cost op-
tion, and may provide other options as well. All benefits packages must be offered to partici-
pants on a community-rated basis. Weil, supra note 77, at 178.
84. See generally id.
85. Joseph P. Newhouse, Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin, & John D. Chapman, Risk Adjust-
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While the Medical Security Act is still in the proposal stage, the national
health insurance plan is not.86 On February 2, 2003, Representative John
Conyer introduced a bill to the House of Representatives8 7 entitled "United
States National Health Insurance Act" ("USNHI") (or the "Expanded and
Improved Medicare for All Act"). The USNHI would provide health care
coverage in the form of a single universal benefits package.88 Private health
plans are prohibited from selling coverage that duplicates the benefits of the
USNHI program, but may provide coverage for non-duplicative health care
such as cosmetic surgery and other medically unnecessary care.89 Under the
USNHI, there is no competition for enrollees; all basic health care is paid for
by a single payer, the federal government, through a service reimbursement
administered pricing system.90
Proponents of the legislation estimate that the cost of national health in-
surance will be $1.8 trillion annually, a reduction of $109 billion over cur-
rent costs. The USNHI would be funded by an additional payroll tax of 3.3%
on employers only.91 The Act envisions also that low and middle income
families pay a smaller share of their incomes for health care than the
wealthiest 5% of Americans upon whom a health income tax will be im-
posed. The out-of-pocket costs of health care for lower and middle-income
families are calculated to be substantially reduced under the USNHI; these
costs would be shifted to the wealthiest individuals and families and to em-
ployers. While employers today can offer health insurance as a tax-
subsidized employee benefit as a matter of business and personal preference,
under the USNHI, the employer payroll tax to subsidize universal health care
86. In addition to HR676, there are a number of states that are contemplating such legis-
lation including California, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. The California single-payer bill,
SB921, sponsored by Senator Sheila Kuehl (D-Santa Monica) was introduced to the Califor-
nia Senate on March 2, 2003. SB921 creates a system of public financing of health care simi-
lar to that used for Medicare. PHYSICIANS FOR A NATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAM, CALIFORNIA
SINGLE-PAYER BILL INTRODUCED at http://www.pnhp.org.news/archives/001682.php (Mar. 4,
2003).
87. This Bill, HR676, is known as the United States National Health Insurance Act or the
Expanded and Improved Medicare for All Act. United States National Health Insurance Act,
H.R. 676, 108th Cong. (2003).
88. The benefits package includes primary care and prevention, inpatient care, outpatient
care, emergency care, prescription drugs, durable medical equipment, long term care, mental
health services, dental services, substance abuse treatment services, chiropractic services and
basic vision care and correction. Id. § 102 (a).
89. See id. §§ 102 (a) (9), 104.
90. See id. §§ 102 (b), 201(c). Currently, under Medicare Parts A and B, the federal gov-
ernment reimburses providers for services at rates set by the Centers for Medicare and Medi-
caid Services (CMS). Under the current system, both physicians and institutions are reim-
bursed prospectively in an effort to align the economic interests of the provider and the payer.
91. Employers and employees would continue to pay the 1.45% Medicare payroll tax
already imposed so that employers would, under the USNHI, be paying a 4.7% payroll tax for
health care. Compare this with the payroll tax proposed by the MSS -3.3% for employees
and 7.7 % for employers-to be applied to the Social Security wage base. PHYSICIANS FOR A
NATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAM, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL
HEALTH INSURANCE ACT (HR676) at http://pnhp.org/nhibill/nhiexecsumm.html.
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would be mandatory. Not only would employers not have a choice with re-
gard to providing health insurance, but also the direct cost shifting from em-
ployers to employees that is a reality of health insurance today could not oc-
cur.
As always, there is no free lunch and the increased cost of providing
universal coverage would necessitate some changes. These could take the
form of cross-subsidization from the insured elite to the uninsured, a direct
or indirect tax on employers, decreased reimbursement to providers, or from
public subsidies paid by increasing payroll and/or income taxes, by an allo-
cation of a greater percentage of GDP to health care spending, or from all of
these sources. Whatever the sources of revenue to fund such a program, it is
certain that a decision to provide universal health coverage to all Americans
is a commitment. If history is a teacher, Americans are unlikely to make this
commitment at this time; we are a polity generally too acculturated in indi-
vidual rights and not enough in community responsibility. And, at a time
when our lives are filled with terrorism, war, huge budget deficits, rising un-
employment, a sinking stock market, skyrocketing health care costs, and a
very strong free market orientation, what is the probability that we can make
universal health coverage a reality? I, like Professor Oberlander, think it very
unlikely. 92
92. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
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